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Trade Regulation: Prior Change in Decisional Law
Limits Retroactivity of Treble Damages
Plaintiff leased machinery from the defendant. Following
a government action' in which the defendant was found guilty
of monopolization in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act 2
as a result of its lease-only policy, plaintiff brought an action
for treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act.3 The trial
court awarded treble damages for the excess of the leasing
costs over the cost of ownership of the same machines had they
been available for purchase for the period from 1939 to the time
of suit.4 The Third Circuit vacated the judgment and awarded a

new trial holding, inter alia,5 that damages could be awarded
only for the period commencing with the time of the change in
decisional law0 upon which the Sherman Act violation was based.
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corporation, 377
F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 36 U.S.L.W. 3143 (U.S. Oct.
9, 1967) (Nos. 335 & 463).
Although changes in decisional law originally were given
retroactive effect, there has been a shift from the Blackstonian
1. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295
(D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
3. Section 4 provides: "Any person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws may sue therefor ... and shall recover three-fold the damages by
him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
Hanover relied upon § 5 (a) of the Clayton Act, which makes the
decree from the government case "prima facie evidence" against United
Shoe "as to all matters respecting which said judgment or decree would
be an estoppel as between the parties

thereto ....

"

15 U.S.C.

§ 16(a) (1964).
4. The suit was commenced prior to the 1955 amendment, 69
Stat. 283, of § 5 of the Clayton Act crealing a federal four-year statute
of limitations in antitrust actions. 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1964). The applicable Pennsylvania six-year statute of limitations was extended
back to 1939 as a result of the tolling provisions of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 16 (b) (1964), and the Wartime Tolling Act § 1, 56 Stat. 781,
as amended, 59 Stat. 306 (1945).
5. This Comment will be limited in scope to the issue of retroactivity. Other issues in the case include the "pass on!' defense, which
the court once again rejected, see Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 281 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), aff'g 185 F. Supp. 826 (D. Pa.), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 901 (1960), and the question of whether defendant
should be permitted to show that plaintiff obtained tax advantages
through the lease-only plan. The court found that the trial court
erred in excluding evidence on this point.
6. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781
(1946).
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view7 that the latest case merely declares what the law has always been, to the "Realist" view s that courts make law. Recognizing that applying a rule retroactively may result in injustice,
courts have occasionally limited new rules to prospective application.
Usually this practice has been confined to decisions
which specifically overrule previous precedents. 10 The question
has seldom been faced in situations where the change is a nonoverruling precedent" or an expanded interpretation of a stat7. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69-70; J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND
SOURCES OF THE LAW 93 (2d ed. 1921). Blackstone's view, however, was
criticized long before the current Realist criticism. See J. AusTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 655 (5th ed. 1885); I. HOLLAND, JURISPRUDENCE 66 (13th ed.
1924); 0. HOLMES, COMMON LAW 35 (1881); Thayer, Judicial Legislation: Its Legitimate Function in the Development of the Common Law,
5 HARV. L. REv. 172 (1891).
8. Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109
U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1960). See generally B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS

(1921); Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure,

70 YALE L.J. 1037 (1961).
9. The Supreme Court has upheld, against an attack based on
due process, a state court's application of precedent to the case under
consideration, while announcing that for the future a new rule would

govern. Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932).

An earlier example of prospective overruling is the first of the "municipal bond cases," Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175

(1863). Similarly, see Moliter v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18
Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), where the new rule was applied to the

case at bar but was otherwise given only prospective effect. See generally Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. REV. 201 (1965); Freeman, The Protection Afforded
Against the Retroactive Operation of an Overruling Decision, 18
COLUM. L. REv.230 (1937); Snyder, Retroactive Operation of Overruling
Decisions, 35 ILL. L. REV. 121 (1940); Note, Prospective-Prospective
Overruling, 51 MINN. L. REV. 79 (1966); Note, Prospective Overruling
and Retroactive Application In the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907
(1962).

10. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 376 U.S. 643 (1961), overruling Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961),
overruling Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946). See generally
Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision: Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 650 (1962); Meador, Habeas
Corpus and the "Retroactivity" Illusion, 50 VA. L. REV. 1115 (1964);
Note, Lin'letter, Shott and the Retroactivity Problem in Escobedo,
64 MICH. L. REV. 832 (1966).
11. Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267 (1951), held for the first time
that a reorganization trustee was liable for profits taken by employees
who were hired to assist in reorganization. The trustee was not aware
that the employees were trading in the securities of the corporation in
reorganization. Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, unsuccessfully argued
that to apply the new rule retroactively to the trustee would be
"grossly unfair" since prior to the decision, his conduct would not have
subjected him to any penalty.

England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S.
411 (1964), held that a litigant foregoes his right under the abstention
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ute. 12

On only two occasions have courts limited the retroactive
effect of a decision which made a significant change in the field
of antitrust law. The first case was Simpson v. Union Oil Company,' 3 where the legality of consignment agreements which
allowed the consignor to set the resale price for the consignee
was challenged. Plaintiff sued for treble damages alleging violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Defendant argued that the marketing arrangement was legal under United
States v. GeneralElectric Company,":' wherein a similar consignment agreement utilized to market patented articles was found
not to violate the antitrust laws. The majority opinion in Union
Oil did not directly overrule General Electric, but instead stated
that "whatever may be said of the General Electric case on its
special facts, involving patents, it is not apposite to the special
facts here."1 5 The Court then held that coercive consignment
agreements constitute an illegal resale price maintenance under
the antitrust laws.' 6 However, the Court reserved the question
of whether the newly announced illegality of consignment devices should have only prospective application in damage suits
by remanding the case for an examination of this issue. 17 On
remand, the trial court found actual reliance by the defendant on General Electric and dismissed the case holding that actions taken pursuant to the consignment agreements prior to
1964 were lawful, reasonable, and warranted under General Elec8
tric.
doctrine to return to federal district court to litigate his federal claims if
he freely and without reservation litigates them in state court. Petitioner
relied on a precedent which he believed, as did the district court, required submission of federal claims to state courts. The Supreme Court
clarified the precedent, however, and determined that it required
only that a litigant inform the state court of his federal claims. The
Court found that plaintiff's view of the precedent was not unreasonable
and the new rule was not applied to him. See Currier, supra note 9,
at 250-52.
12. However, where parties have entered into contracts or other
transactions in reliance upon prior statutory or constitutional interpretations an overruling decision has generally been denied retroactive effect.
See, e.g., Anderson v. Santa Anna, 116 U.S. 356 (1886); Green County v.
Conness, 109 U.S. 104 (1883); Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S.
(1 Wall.) 175 (1863); Ohio Life Ins. & Txust Co. v. Debolt, 57 U.S. (16
How.) 415 (1853). See generally Snyder, supra note 9, at 131, 133, 134
n.126.
13.

377 U.S. 13 (1964).

14. 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
15.

377 U.S. 13, 23 (1964).

16. Id. at 24.
17. Id. at 25.
18. 270 F. Supp. 754, 757, (N.D. Cal. 1967).
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In Lyons v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation0 plaintiff
brought a treble damage action alleging defendants' marketing
arrangements violated the antitrust laws. Defendants argued
that nearly identical marketing arrangements had been sustained by the Supreme Court in General Electric. Hence, the
issue presented was whether Union Oil, which held that resale
price maintenance by consignment agreement constituted an antitrust violation, should be applied to a defendant who had claimed
reliance on General Electric. The trial judge recognized that
Union Oil limited General Electric to its special facts,2 0 and
that the significant fact in General Electric was the existence of
General Electric's patents. He reasoned that whether Union Oil
overruled or merely limited General Electric was a matter of
semantics and that, where there were no patents present, the
rule in General Electric was no longer the law.21 After a thorough review of the subject 22 the trial court denied retroactivity
to Union Oil, reasoning that to hold defendant liable for damages for making contracts which were "perfectly legal at the
time ...made ...would be manifestly unjust.' 23
Previously, the Supreme Court had found three times 24 that
United's lease-only policy did not violate the antitrust laws.25
In the case brought by the government against United 2 upon
which the instant case was based, the court ruled that these decisions precluded a holding that United's lease-only policy violated
section I of the Sherman Act. Instead, based on a finding of
monopolization, it held that United had violated section 2 of the
Sherman Act.27 The court expressly found that United's mo19. 235 F. Supp. 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
20. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
21. 235 F. Supp. 526, 535 (1964).
22. The court noted that the case most nearly in point was Gelpcke
v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1863).
23. 235 F. Supp. 526, 537 (1964).
24. United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922);
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918); United
States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202 (1913).
25. In United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918),
United prevailed in an action alleging violation of §§ 1-2 of the Sherman Act. The Court, with three Justices dissenting, found that the
company did not unite seven competing companies for the purpose of
restraining trade, and that any monopoly power accrued through the
exercise of patent rights was lawfully exercised through the lease
system. In United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451
(1922), certain provisions of United's leases were enjoined under § 3
of the Clayton Act.
26. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295
(D. Mass. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
27. Id. at 343.
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nopoly power was not predicated upon predatory practices,
which had not been an essential prerequisite to finding an illegal
monopolization since American Tobacco Company v. United
States2 8 was decided in 1946.29
In the instant case, the Third Circuit rejected United's contention that the government decree should have no retroactive
effect, and accepted the reasoning of the court in the government case that the law had been changed in 1946. The court
thus limited the retroactive effect of the decree to the change in
decisional law upon which the violation was based, thereby holding simultaneously that American Tobacco was to apply prospectively only. In rejecting United's contention, the court indicated that such a finding would subvert the purpose of prima
facie evidence provisions of the Clayton Act,30 since a decree is
prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation only in cases where
the damage period is within the period included in the govern3
ment case. '
Therefore, the court found that it was error to compute
damages from 1939 to 1955, the allowable statute of limitations
period,3 2 but that United's liability commenced at the date of the
American Tobacco decision in 1946. 3 3 The factors the court considered as bearing on the question of retroactivity included
the earlier Supreme Court decisions as to United's lease-only
policy, the injustice of the retroactive imposition of treble dam28. 328 U.S. 781 (1953). In American Tobacco the Supreme Court
expressly approved, 328 U.S. at 814-15, Judge Learned Hand's analysis

of United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
Prior to Alcoa, predatory practices had been held to be an essential
element of monopolization. The trial judge in the government proceeding against United found that notwithstanding absence of predatory
practices, its conduct, although "honestly industrial," violated § 2 of the

Sherman Act under the Alcoa doctrine.
29. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295,
341-43 (D. Mass. 1953).

30.
31.

15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964). See note 3 supra.
Dart Drug Corp. v. Park, Davis & Co., 344 F.2d 173, 184-86

(D.C. Cir. 1965); International Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 315 F.2d 449 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 280 (1963).
32. See notes 4 & 30 supra.
33. The court held that liability commenced at the date of the
American Tobacco decision rather than the date of the Alcoa decision,
stating:
We do not believe, however, that another business which had
three times in various forms been adjudged free from violation
of the Sherman Act was required to abandon its well known
form of operation before Judge Hand's view in Alcoa received
the imprimatur of the Supreme Court, however inevitable it
may now seem in retrospect.

377 F.2d at 789.
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ages, and the absence of predatory practices in United's control
of the market. Finally, after recognizing that the question
of retroactivity in antitrust cases is open, 4 the court stated
that the issue would have to be adjudicated on a case-by-case
basis by balancing the purpose which the change of law seeks
to accomplish against the comparative value of retroactivity.35
A comparison of the present case with Lyons demonstrates
the import of the Third Circuit's position. In each case, the defendant relied on a marketing arrangement which had previously been affirmed by the Supreme Court. Both courts used
the same reasoning, comparing the purpose of the new rule36 to
the injustice, due to reliance, which might result if the new
rule were given retroactive effect. The significant difference,
however, is that the change of law relied on in Lyons was
treated as an overruled precedent whose application to Lyons
was quite clear, while the change relied on by the Hanover
court was merely an expanded interpretation of "monopolization"
as used in section 2 of the Sherman Act. Moreover, the change
of law referred to in Hanover was an extremely broad and
somewhat unclear extension which did not deal directly with
the precedents upon which United had ostensibly relied.
The problem raised by the Third Circuit's denial of retroactive application of American Tobacco is whether prospective
limitation is proper in "nonoverruling" cases. Every decision
involves some variation from existing law. In many situations
the losing party in a law suit will have relied on an erroneous
interpretation of the law.3 7 But because of the severe sanction
provided by treble damages, the question of retroactivity is arguably more crucial in the area of antitrust law.
If the question of retroactivity is to be determined on a
case-by-case basis as suggested by Hanover, it is necessary to
weigh the policy considerations in light of the circumstances
of each case. The prime consideration advanced for limiting
34. Id., citing Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964); Lyons
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 235 F. Supp. 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
35. 377 F.2d at 789.
36. The court in Lyons reasoned that the purpose of the Union
Oil doctrine was to prohibit price fixing by means of an agency or
consignment agreement to the end that competition shall be unrestrained.
The Lyons court noted that treble damages paid in 1964 would not
revive competition in 1951, the date of the damage period of the civil
suit. This reasoning begs the question in treble damage actions based
upon prior government suits which have already eliminated the restraint.
37. Currier, supra note 9, at 250.
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retroactive application ss-the protection of parties who have relied on prior decisions 39 -must be balanced against the policy
for applying every decision retroactively-the desirability of
compensating victims 40 and the deterrent effect that the threat

of private treble damage actions may have on potential antitrust violators.

41

An analysis of the reliance consideration involves the question of whether the defendant actually relied upon earlier decisions, and whether that reliance was justified. 42 Where the
defendant's conduct has been expressly approved in an earlier
adjudication, as the instant case, the reliance argument is
strongest. 43 However, others relying on the same decision will
meet the additional difficulty of applying the rule to their own,
possibly distinguishable situation. 44 Whether a party's reliance
38. Id., at 234-50, suggesting that the values protected by stare decisis and therefore by prospective limitation include (1) stability, (2)
reliance, (3) efficiency in the administration of justice, (4) equality, and
(5) the image of the courts.
39. Id. at 235; Note, Prospective Operation of Decisions Holding
Statutes Unconstitutionalor Overruling PriorDecisions, 60 HARV. L.REV.
437, 440 (1947); Note, Limitation of Judicial Decisions to Prospective
Operation, 46 IowA L. REV. 600, 601 (1961). Cf. B. CARnozo, THE
GROWTH OF THE LAw 122 (1924): "The picture of the bewildered
litigant lured into a course of action by the false light of a decision,
only to meet ruin when the light is extinguished and the decision overruled, is for the most part a figment of excited brains."
40 It has been suggested that courts be given discretion to award
less than treble damages while still allowing compensation. AT'y
GN.NAT'L ComvI. ANTITRUST REP. 373-79 (1955). Contra, McConnell,
The Treble Damage Issue: A Strong Dissent, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 342
(1955).
41. United States v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 137 F.
Supp. 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest
Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTITRUST BULL. 167 (1958); Wham, Antitrust

Treble-Damage Suits: The Government's Chief Aid in Enforcement,
40 A.B.A.J. 1061 (1954).
42. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 270 F. Supp. 754 (S.D. Cal. 1967).
43. Cf. State v.Jones, 44 N.M. 623, 107 P.2d 324 (1940), where in a
criminal action the same defendant was involved in both the precedent
and the overruling decision. Similarly, it may be claimed that a
failure of government agencies to challenge a well-known transaction or
course of conduct will give rise to equally sympathetic reliance. Small
heed was paid to this argument in United States v. E. I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957), where an acquisition of stock made
by defendant thirty years earlier was held to be in violation under a
new interpretation of § 7 of the Clayton Act.
44. Compare Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of
Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), and Toolson v. New
York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1959), with United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955), and United States v. Shubert,
348 U.S. 222 (1955).
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is justifiable turns on many factors affecting the practical
weight of the precedent. For instance, where a court expressly
limits or overrules an existing precedent on a specific issue, the
notice of the change in law afforded to parties relying on that
precedent is so clear that no subsequent claim of reliance can be
justified. Similarly, where a precedent has lost all vitality due
to subsequent decisions, or has been limited to its special
facts by subsequent cases, or every effort has been made to
distinguish it, a claim of reliance should not be protected. 45
Moreover, where a strong dissent argues that a case falls within
a conflicting line of authority which is not overruled and which
might furnish a conflicting rule for closely analogous situations,
reliance on a precedent is probably not as justifiable as when
the decision was unanimous and clearly applicable. 46 When a
court makes no reference to prior, conflicting authority, however,
defendant's continued reliance on previous decisions is accordingly more justifiable.
The reliance consideration must be weighed against the
policy underlying section 4, the private treble damage provision
of the Clayton Act. The purpose of this section is to encourage
private parties to assist the government in enforcing the antitrust laws 41 and, in this respect, it has served as an effective
augmentation to the government's attempt to protect competition.48 While it is important to protect the reliance of business on the existing state of the law, the effect of carrying the
argument to its extreme would be to subvert the deterrent effect
of the treble damage provisions of section 4. The denial of
treble damages in each situation wherein the defendant's activities had not been expressly declared illegal would emasculate
both the purpose and effectiveness of section 4.
On the Hanover facts, if United's reliance were to be protected without qualification, the company should be liable for
damages occurring only after those decisions implicitly sustaining its lease-only policy were overruled. This proposition was
properly rejected by the Third Circuit as inconsistent with the
purpose of treble damage actions. Furthermore, even though
45. See Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application
in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907, 947 (1962).
46. Id. at 946.
47. Flintkoke Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 398 (9th Cir. 1957);
Loevinger, supra note 41, at 168. See United States v. Borden Co., 347
U.S. 514, 518 (1954); Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330
U.S. 743, 751 (1947).
48. Macntyre, The Role of the Private Litigant in Antitrust Enforcement, 7 ANTITRUST BULL. 113, 129 (1962).
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the lease-only policy had been implicitly upheld previously and
United's practices were found not to be predatory, United was
no longer justified in relying on the earlier adjudications after
the Supreme Court's substantial alteration of the law in American Tobacco.49 The fact that United had been found to control
ninety per cent of the shoe machinery market in previous litigation,50 notwithstanding the absence of predatory practices,
was sufficient to meet the standar& of illegality of section 2 of
the Sherman Act. The applicability of American Tobacco to
United's position seems clear, thus justifying the limitation of
the treble damage remedy prospectively from that time. In addition, since the court limited the retroactive effect of the government decree and reduced the damages, without denying recovery, both the compensatory and. deterrent functions of the
treble damage provisions were fulfilled as of the time defendant
should have been on notice of the possible illegality of its conduct.
While a limitation of a precedent to prospective application
seems equitable with regard to a case representing a substantial change in the law, it is submitted that the practice should
not be extended, at the expense of precluding treble damage actions, to decisions which are merely part of recognizable and
foreseeable development of established antitrust doctrines. If
the intervening decision is unclear or if a case of first impression makes a substantial change in the existing status of the law,
the policy of the antitrust laws is not defeated by a denial of
treble damages in the case of a violation based on such change.
Given a strong case for reliance on a particular stage in the
development of antitrust law, no policy is furthered by a granting of treble damages based on a new and extended interpretation of that law. Only when an intervening decision or series
of cases has indicated a clear departure can it be argued that
the policy of section 4 is fulfilled by the imposition of treble
damages, since it is undesirable and at best difficult to attempt
to deter conduct which heretofore had not been held illegal.
To conclude otherwise would be to grant the treble damage
claimant a windfall without advancing the purpose of the antitrust laws.
49. "[Tjhe material consideration in determining whether a monopoly exists is not that prices are raised and that competition actually
is excluded but that power exists to raise prices or to exclude competition when it is desired to do so." 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946). See
note 28 supra and accompanying text.
50. United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 455
(1922).

